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The British Peace Movement in the
Interwar Years




Up until 1914, diplomacy and the conduct of international affairs were regarded as being
very much part of the secretive world of “high” politics. This remained true throughout
the interwar years,  in spite  of  the hopes held in some quarters  that  the world,  and
Britain, were entering a new age where the old-style diplomatic practices, carried out
behind the closed doors of the European chancelleries, would be done away with. The
same hopes had underlain President Wilson’s Fourteen Points set out in January 1918 as
part of his proposals for peace. They were also an important part of the thinking behind
the League of Nations, set up in 1920 to prevent the world going back to the system of
international rivalries, arms races and military alliances that had led to such disastrous
results in 1914-18. In their place the ambition was to create a new world order based on
democracy rather than the autocratic regimes that had been swept away by the war, on
international  law,  on  reconciliation  and  conciliation,  disarmament  and  international
arbitration. As a last resort, this would be backed up by a system of collective security
based on economic and, if needed, military sanctions against an international aggressor.
All these hopes and beliefs found a particularly receptive ground in Britain in the 1920s
and 1930s,  which saw the growth of a series of  pacifist  and internationalist  anti-war
movements. Their objective was summed up in the popular phrases “No More War” or
“Never Again.” They also sought to operate as pressure groups acting on public opinion in
Britain and, in collaboration with other like-minded groups abroad, internationally, and
on governments. In the aftermath of the horrors of the First World War, the possibilities
for  pacifist  and anti-war  movements  to  have  an impact  on policy  were  significantly
enhanced. Of all the forms of political activism in Britain in the twentieth century, those
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that were part of what may broadly be termed the peace movement were among the most
widely supported and influential.
 
The Pacific Outlook of Britain in the Interwar Years
In considering the concept of a “peace movement” in the context of twentieth-century
Britain it is necessary to more clearly define what these movements were, what precisely
they were campaigning for, the ways in which they sought to exercise an influence over
policy-makers, and how far they were successful in redirecting policy along pacifist, or at
least peaceful, lines. 
Peace as an objective was shared by almost the whole country. This was based on both a
moral  standpoint  and  on  material  interests.  The  revulsion  against  war  was  almost
universal. This was backed up by solid economic and political arguments that further
encouraged the pursuit of international peace. The British Empire had reached its peak
after 1918, and there was no desire for any further territorial gains. Britain’s economy, its
precarious national finances and its trade had everything to lose from another war. All of
this meant that Britain had become a satiated power, interested in holding onto what it
had  and  maintaining  its  international  position,  whose  outlook  was  essentially
conservative and peaceful, a country that had little or no interest in becoming involved in
a major international conflict or reliving the experiences of 1914-18. This did not mean
that Britain had become a pacifist power and the pursuit of peace in Europe after 1918
needs to be contrasted with the violence it  employed in other parts of  the world to
maintain its Empire, including the harsh repression of numerous anti-imperial nationalist
movements. The cases of Ireland, India and the Middle East, where the policy of so-called
“air policing” involved the aerial bombardment of recalcitrant tribes, stand out as proof
of this inconsistency in British attitudes. Britain’s position was, nonetheless, essentially a
defensive one with regard to the other great powers. 
In 1914, there had been a broad national consensus over the decision to enter the war.
The experience  of  the  following four  years,  however,  was  to  transform the  national
feeling. The refusal to contemplate another war became deeply embedded in the “lost”
generation that had lived through 1914-18, and in the one that followed on from it. This
sentiment was reinforced by a perfectly rational calculation of Britain’s position. As one
historian has argued, “it may help us to understand better the overall context of British policy in
the interwar years if we bear in mind that these are the actions of a country with nothing to gain,
and much to lose,  by being involved in war.  Peace in such circumstances was the greatest of
national interests.”1 Neville Chamberlain, the Prime Minister from 1937 until 1940, made
this point on numerous occasions: “our object”, he said, 
must  always  be  to  preserve  these  things  which  we  consider  essential  without
recourse  to  war,  if  that  is  possible,  because  we know that  in  war  there  are  no
winners. There is nothing but suffering and ruin for those who are involved... When
I think of those four terrible years and I think of the seven millions of young men
who were cut off in their prime... then I am bound to say... in war, whichever side
may call itself the victor, there are no winners, but all are losers.2 
His predecessor in Downing Street, Stanley Baldwin, thought war “the most fearful terror
and prostitution of man’s knowledge that ever was known.”3 King George V thought along the
same lines. In one angry outburst he declared “I will not have another war. I will not. The last
one was none of my doing and if there were another one and we are threatened with being brought
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into it, I will go to Trafalgar Square and wave a red flag myself sooner than allow this country to be
brought  in.”4 Similar  feelings  were  being  expressed  from  the  late  1920s  onwards  in
numerous books and plays that took on anti-war themes.
The success of the peace movements of the interwar years was, therefore, in many ways, a
simple reflection of the general mood in the country. All British governments at this time
were  inevitably  concerned  by  public  opinion;  their  ability  to  remain  in  office  was
dependent on this and their ability to pursue the policies they supported could never, in
the long-term, go against the views of the country. In the interwar years, when questions
of war and peace, and of foreign policy, played such a prominent role in public debate,
and when they were of such obviously immediate concern, the various peace movements
that emerged during and after the First World War, and that were able to mobilize a mass
following in some cases, were players that no government could afford to ignore. The
leading British historian of the interwar British peace movement has argued that it was “
not only the most influential of any major country’s... but also the most legitimate in the sense of
being accepted even by its opponents as idealistic and public-spirited rather than subversive or
selfish”5, “the most interesting and influential pacifist movement in modern times.”6
 
Peace Movements: Pacifism and Pacificism
It has been estimated that there were over 50 peace organizations in Britain between the
Wars,  many  of  which  gained  a  significant  membership.  Their  activities,  including
organizing  demonstrations,  boycotts,  pamphleteering and speeches,  were  carried  out
with messianic zeal and employed the most up-to-date propaganda techniques. The most
important petition, the League of Nation Union’s (LNU) “Peace Ballot”, was signed by over
12 million people. Over 100,000 responded to “Dick” Sheppard’s “Peace Pledge” and his
call to renounce war. They were, therefore, able to mobilize the support of a great many
people in the country and from all groups in society and of different political allegiances.
This diversity could be seen as a source of strength. At times, however, it led to a lack of
coherence and to internal disputes that weakened its impact and its appeal to the public.
What it meant to be a member or a sympathizer of one of the component parts of the
overall peace movement was never entirely clear and this question has been the subject
of a great deal of debate amongst historians since. In particular, the exact nature of the
pacifism defended by groups such as the Peace Pledge Union (PPU) and others has been
open to differing interpretations. If we take pacifism in the broadest terms as a belief that
it is possible to settle international disputes by peaceful means then this could reasonably
be applied to the country as a whole and almost all those involved in the conduct of
British foreign policy in the 1930s as well as, more obviously, to the supporters of the
peace movement. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that the term “pacifism” was used,
both as a compliment and as an insult, in quite contradictory ways. Even if a stricter
definition of pacifism as “the belief that all wars are wrong”7 is accepted, both pacifists
and many inside official  circles can be included.  If,  however,  it  is  considered as “the
doctrine that the abolition of war is both desirable and possible”8 then the clear distinction
between the two sides re-emerges.
Further clarification of this terminology is required in order to distinguish between the
different  tendencies  and factions  that  coexisted  within  the  peace  movement.  Gilbert
Murray, the Chairman of the LNU, explained one of these differences in the following
terms: 
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Supposing  all  measures  of  conciliation  and  arbitration  fail,  supposing
collective non-cooperation breaks down and the war-maker finds his course
free before him. They (the pacifists), I presume, will say: ‘Let him work his
will. Submission is at least better than war.’ The true Leaguer will still have
two resources left: first, to try even yet to deter the aggressor by showing
that  he  will  be  confronted  by  so  strong  an  alliance  that  conference  and
arbitration will pay him much better than war; and at last, at the very last,
rather  than  acquiesce  in  the  unopposed  triumph  of  evil,  to  accept  his
challenge and fight for the law.9
Historians such as A.J.P.  Taylor and Martin Ceadel  have added to this  conception by
distinguishing between pacifists and pacificists. For Taylor “pacificism” meant no more
than “the advocacy of a peaceful policy” whereas he took pacifism, “a word invented only in
the  twentieth  century”,  to  mean  “the  doctrine  of  non-resistance.”10 In  this  sense,  the
fundamental  belief  of  pacifists  was that  war was always wrong and should never be
resorted to, whatever the consequences of not fighting. Pacificism, on the other hand,
was a set of ideas that opposed war as an irrational and inhumane means of resolving
international conflicts but that did not rule out the recourse to war as a last resort - and
so long as it was in a just cause: a defensive and not an offensive action, one that was in
the name of collective security and cautioned by international law.11 Different groups and
organizations that correspond to these various definitions could all be found within the
broad British peace movement in the interwar years.
 
Christianity, Socialism, Utilitarianism and Humanism
in British Peace Movements
The diversity  of  the British peace movement resulted from its  numerous and varied
sources of inspiration. Much of the pacifist tradition in Britain had emerged out of the
various  churches  well  before  1914  and  during  the  1920s  and  1930s  many  pacifists
continued to base their beliefs on their religion. Some of the most notable pacifist leaders
of  these  years,  such as  “Dick”  Sheppard and Canon Charles  Raven,  were  themselves
churchmen. The collective engagement of the Quakers to the cause was also significant,
less in terms of numbers than in their organisational and ideological inputs. They played
a particularly prominent role in the Fellowship of Reconciliation founded at the outbreak
of war in 1914 and which continued to operate into the 1930s. Not all Church leaders,
however,  supported  the  peace  movement,  even  in  its  most  moderate  incarnations.
Indeed, there were some who continued with the jingoism that had been heard during the
First World War. The Archbishop of York, William Temple, even condemned pacifism as a
heresy.
Pacifism had always been attractive from the socialist or Marxist perspective and it won
many adherents from within the Labour Party, the Independent Labour Party (ILP) and
the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). This was reflected in their opposition to
rearmament under a  Conservative-led government that might  use those arms not  to
defend the country against international aggression but to turn them on the workers at
home. In the Marxist analysis, both war and fascism were the products of capitalism and
should therefore be opposed jointly. Equally, war could be avoided by pacifist actions and
capitalism overthrown at the same time. Should capitalist regimes declare war then this
should be met by internationally coordinated action by the working classes. By workers
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simply refusing to fight, and by mass resistance through a general strike, war would be
brought  to  an  immediate  halt.  Although  there  were  some  of  the  left,  such  as  John
Strachey, who placed great hope in this prospect, and others on the right who feared it
with equal strength,12 this belief in the international solidarity of the working classes to
act in unison failed to materialize, just as it had failed to stop war in 1914.
Among the most prominent of the socialist-inclined pacifist groups was the No More War
Movement (NMWM),  founded in 1921 as  a  pacifist  and socialist  successor to the No-
Conscription  Fellowship.  It  counted  among  its  leaders  Fenner  Brockway  and  several
members  of  the  ILP.  The  more  communist-inspired  British  Anti-War  Movement  was
established in 1932 in the wake of an international conference held at The Hague. It held
its first meeting in March 1933 attended by British communists, members of the Labour
Party and the ILP, and various other pacifists. These socialist pacifist groups, like the left-
wing political parties themselves, were rarely able to coordinate their actions. The Anti-
War Movement was banned by Labour as a communist satellite while the NMWM and
others rounded on what they condemned as the “bourgeois” pacifism of more moderate
groups.  Such viewpoints  were not,  however,  fixed over the course of  the 1930s.  The
evolutions in the relations between the parties of the left, and between them and other
non-socialist anti-fascist groups with the emergence of a popular front strategy, meant
that alliances often shifted. After having initially condemned Sheppard and the PPU, the
NMWM agreed in 1937 to a merger.  Where they had once condemned the League of
Nations, and therefore its supporters in the LNU, as a tool of capitalist governments,
many left-wing pacifists had, by 1936, come out in support of collective security and the
League as useful weapons with which to resist the spread of fascism. 
Another  strand  of  thinking  in  the  peace  movement  came  from  Bertrand  Russell’s
utilitarian argument that “modern war is practically certain to have worse consequences than
even the most unjust peace.”13 Given his prediction that any future European war would
result in the deaths of between 50 and 90 per cent of its population, war could never be a
logical or justifiable choice. This was backed up, first, by his belief that the Nazi regime
could  be  brought  round  to  a  more  reasonable  position  via  some  form  of  economic
appeasement and,  second,  by his  fears  that  even if  a  war was fought  and won by a
democracy it would bring about an unacceptable curtailment of liberties. Russell wrote
that if attempts were made to stop international aggressors by war then “we shall, in the
process become exactly like them, and the world will have gained nothing. Also, if we beat them, we
shall produce in time someone as much worse than Hitler as he is worse than the Kaiser.”14
Humanitarian sentiments also underlay much of the pacifist thinking at this time. Aldous
Huxley, among others, defended pacifism in essentially spiritual terms, arguing that it
had,
the double merit  of being not only morally right,  but also strictly practical  and
business-like. Guided by the moral intuition that it can never in any circumstances
be right to do evil and by the two empirically verified generalizations, first, that
means determine ends and, second, that by behaving well to other people you can
always, in the long run, induce other people to behave well to you... the only right
and practical policy is a policy based on truth and generosity.15
The viability of this humanitarian and utilitarian pacifism came down to the fundamental
belief that international disputes were inherently irrational and that, given the inevitable
horrors that would come with modern warfare, no country would be so foolish as to
resort to such a policy. Pacifists such as Donald Soper were still able to claim in 1936 that
there was a “real yearning for peace not least of all in countries like Italy and Germany.”16 This
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belief, or hope, in the reasonableness of peoples and governments across the world and in
the efficacy of a policy of non-violent resistance as a means of preventing war was an
increasingly unconvincing argument as the 1930s progressed. The argument that “against
a Pacifist England, Fascist Germany would be completely incapable of making war”17 may have
been supported by some but it was never likely to have much impact on mainstream
opinion in the country and even less so on those in government. 
The  above-mentioned  pacifist  groups  remained  relatively  small  in  terms  of  their
membership,  although they were able to exercise a certain influence thanks to their
positions within the political parties of the left, in the churches and on public opinion
through  their  campaigning  activities.  The  most  significant  part  of  the  British  peace
movement,  however,  was  found  outside these  groups.  The  two  most  significant
organizations were the LNU and the PPU. By far the most important mass movement was
the LNU whose membership peaked in 1931 at over 400,000. Although this had fallen by
more than 50 per cent by 1939 it remained a significant political player and by far the
most influential of all the groups that made up the peace movement in interwar Britain.
Unlike the pacifists’ simple opposition to war in all its forms, the LNU adopted a more
pacificist approach. From 1934-35 onwards, it also became a key advocate of the League’s
collective security and internationalist role. This was a line that set it at odds with many
pacifists who remained opposed to war at any cost.
The  high  point  of  the  LNU  came  in  1934-35  when  it  organized  its  “Peace  Ballot.”
Approximately eleven and a half million people, or around 32 per cent of everyone over
eighteen, took part. It also mobilized half a million volunteers who went from door to
door distributing and collecting the ballot papers. Its first question was “Should Great
Britain remain a  Member of  the League of  Nations?”  11,166,818,  or  95.9  per  cent  of
respondents answered “yes.” To the second question, “Are you in favour of an all-round
reduction of armaments by international agreement?”, 10,542,738 (90.6 per cent) replied
positively. There were slightly lower percentages in favour of the all-round abolition of
military aircraft (82.5 per cent) and for the prohibition of the manufacture and sale of
armaments  for  private  profit  (90.1  per  cent).  Over  ten  million  (86.8  per  cent  of
respondents) came out in favour of the use of economic and non-military measures in
response to an international aggression. These figures dropped significantly when asked
if they would support military measures. In reply to this final question 6.8 million (58.7
per cent) said “yes”, 2.37 million (20.3 per cent) said “no”, and 2.38 million (20.4 per cent)
gave no answer. The option for respondents to identify themselves as “Christian pacifist”
was included in the last questions. 14,169 chose this reply when asked about economic
sanctions and 17,536 when asked about the use of military sanctions. These represented
0.1 and 0.2 per cent of all answers.
The LNU was certainly the most important of the peace movements in terms of numbers,
but its size also meant that it was never entirely united. In 1937, Gilbert Murray wrote to
the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, complaining that the LNU was “having trouble... with
some  of  our  members  –  chiefly  Youth  Groups  and  Pacifists  –  who  oppose  rearmament  and
recruiting”  unless  the  government  committed  itself  to  only  using  military  force  “in
accordance with the (League of Nations) Covenant.”18 Overall, however, the LNU remained a
moderate organization, one that 
appeared to be very much a middle-class do-gooder movement, high-minded and
respectable, basically moral in content and attractive to ‘liberals’ of all parties. It
did have pacifist and leftist members who were more in the tradition of radical
dissent than of liberal high-mindedness. However, the group as a whole-even where
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it  advocated  disarmament  or  internationalism,  which  could  have  been  radical
causes-was  so  cautious  in  its  advocacy  that  it  remained  thoroughly  safe  and
respectable.19
The more radical and uncompromisingly pacifist PPU was also able to bring together a
wide range of leading thinkers and to mobilize a mass membership of over 100,000. It
originated in October 1934 when Sheppard’s “Peace Letter” was published in the press. In
this he argued that Britain should never support another war and he called on all those
men who agreed with his principles to send him a postcard in support of his campaign.
“The main reason for this letter”, he wrote, was 
the almost universally acknowledged lunacy of the manner in which nations are
pursuing peace... the risks we are running by our present methods (are) far graver
than those which a more enlightened policy would involve... It seems essential to
discover whether or not it be true...  that the majority of thoughtful men in this
country are now convinced that war of every kind or for any cause, is not only a
denial  of  Christianity,  but  a  crime  against  humanity,  which  is  no  longer  to  be
permitted by civilized people.... 
It concluded with the declaration: “I renounce war and never again, directly or indirectly, will I
support another.”20 Within twelve months 80,000 cards had been received. 
It was out of this initiative that the PPU was formally launched in May 1936. Among its
members were some of the most influential writers, intellectuals and political activists of
the 1930s including Osbert Sitwell,  J.D. Beresford, George Lansbury, Fenner Brockway,
Ellen Wilkinson, Arthur Ponsonby, Aldous Huxley, Vera Brittain, Bertrand Russell (after
some  hesitation),  ex-Brigadier  General  F.P.  Crozier,  Edmund  Blunden  and  Siegfried
Sassoon.  George  Bernard  Shaw and  Virginia  Woolf,  while  never  becoming  signed-up
members, expressed their support and contributed to its cause. This group was no doubt
intellectually distinguished but, in the words of one among them, they were “an odd lot.”21
It was, above all, the personal role of Sheppard that was the driving force behind the PPU
and when he died at the early age of 57 in October 1937 the organization suffered a severe
setback. His friends and biographers have written of him as “a legend while he lived... a man
unique in his dedication to humanity,”22 describing him as a “genius” and even as a “saint.”23
On his death crowds of people lined the streets of London and his funeral service was
broadcast by the BBC. By sheer hard work and determination and thanks to his charisma
Sheppard was able to give Christian pacifism a mass appeal. He also succeeded in uniting
various Christian, socialist and humanitarian strands of interwar pacifism. The PPU’s key
characteristic  was  its  broad  appeal  and  the  heterogeneity  of  its  membership,  its
sympathizers, and its leadership. It was also remarkable for the enthusiasm of its activists
and its ability to attract many young people who had not previously been committed to
any group or cause. It was, according to one historian, 
a typical  example of  the moral  impulse of  the time.  For all  its  shortcomings,  it
represented a genuine and significant protest against the evils of modern war… (It)
possessed not only well-known names, but was able to harness the enthusiasm of
the young to create a crusade of formidable dimensions.
Yet the same author had also to recognize that it was weakened by internal divisions
between its supporters coming from the left and right of British politics, by the fact that
its only fixed position was the “negative pledge of war renunciation” and that beyond this
the PPU’s message was “exceedingly nebulous.”24
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Peace Movements and Politicians: Integration and
Opposition
The Labour Party had traditionally been associated with the peace movements and many
of  the  country’s  leading  peace  activists  could  be  found  among  its  ranks.  But  this
association between the Labour Party and the peace movement underwent important
changes in the 1930s. In particular, the 1935 Party Conference held in Brighton was an
important moment in the redirection of Labour’s foreign and defence policies. The party
leader since 1931, George Lansbury, was a convinced Christian pacifist and close to the
peace movement and its leaders. As such he could have been expected to be a useful
means by which this  movement could bring to bear its  influence.  By 1935,  however,
Lansbury’s position as party leader was untenable as the party, and its powerful trade
union backers, moved away from their previous endorsement of an anti-militarist, anti-
armaments  position and towards a  more internationalist  approach that  accepted the
need to react  forcefully against  the rising tide of  international  aggression through a
policy of collective security. Lansbury enjoyed the personal sympathy of large parts of the
Labour Party but his uncompromising pacifist position was clearly at odds with the way
the party was moving. Having been attacked by Hugh Dalton and Ernest Bevin, Lansbury
chose to resign. Other pacifists in the party also stepped down: Arthur Ponsonby as party
leader in the Lords and Stafford Cripps from the National Executive. 
The Conservative Party leadership was never as inclined to work alongside the peace
movement as was the Labour leadership. Yet, as we have seen, they did share the peace
movement’s deep abhorrence of war. On the other hand, many Liberals worked closely
with the LNU. The National Liberal leader and Foreign Secretary from 1934 to 1935, Sir
John Simon, was described as “a congenital pacifist.”25 Most Conservatives, however, shared
the view that the peace movement, while it could not be ignored, and even if it contained
within  its  ranks  many  Conservative  voters,  could  not  quite  be  trusted.  Neville
Chamberlain,  for  example,  was  keen  to  distance  himself  from the  peace  movement.
‘Pacifism’, for him, was a term of abuse that he applied equally to the PPU and to the
more moderate and respectable LNU. “I can find no polite words to express my opinion of the
LNU”, he wrote to his sister. “The kind of person who is really enthusiastic about the League is
almost invariably a crank and a Liberal and as such will always pursue the impracticable and
obstruct  all  practical  means of  attaining the object  in  view.”26 Their electoral  importance,
however, could not be so easily ignored.
The view of the peace movement, and of the PPU in particular, from the Foreign Office
was even more scathing: the Permanent Under-Secretary, Robert Vansittart, thought that
Sheppard was “harmful” and that the PPU “drew in many otherwise balanced, even gifted,
souls”; the policies he was advocating were “helping to endanger lives by the million.”27 The
Secretary to the Cabinet, Maurice Hankey, dismissed the pacifist wing of the LNU as “
hopelessly unpractical  and generally badly informed to boot”28,  although he also indirectly
recognized the peace movement’s influence when he denounced the “moral disarmament”
of the country brought about by LNU and pacifist propaganda. These views were echoed
abroad by Britain’s  French allies.  The Foreign Minister  in  1936,  Pierre  Flandin,  later
complained  of  the  “superpacifistes  anglo-saxons  germanophiles”29 who  were  influencing
British foreign policy in dangerous ways. Inside the British Cabinet there were worries
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that recruitment to the armed forces was being made more difficult by the pacifists’
propaganda campaign. The Minister of Defence warned that:
into  the  more  thoughtful  and semi-educated minds  of  the  young men of  today
persistent  and  widespread  propaganda  is  being  poured  with  the  object  of
persuading them that it is wicked to join the Army... The pacifist campaign has had
a long start and is being pursued with vigour... This propaganda is not confined to
sermons and speeches. It is also supported by films, plays, novels and all the arts of
the publicity agent.... 
Recognizing the enormous potential support for the PPU, the Minister admitted that “
propaganda is  never  so  powerful  as  when it  is  directed  towards  persuading  people  to  act  in
accordance with their own inclinations”.30
Despite this mix of fear and denigration of the peace movement in government circles
there  were  many  ways  in  which  it  was  well  integrated  into  the  political  and  social
establishment.  Even  in  the  most  socially  elitist  and  traditionally  conservative  of
universities pacifism seemed to be gaining ground. On 9 February 1933, the University of
Oxford Union debated the motion “That this House will in no circumstances fight for its
King and Country.” The motion was passed. In political circles too the peace movement
was able to get its message across. Robert Cecil,  one of the driving forces behind the
creation of the League of Nations and the President of the LNU from 1923 until 1945, was
clearly an establishment figure. The son of one Prime Minister and the cousin of another,
his nephew was the Junior Minister at the Foreign Office. He was also a King’s Counsel and
had sat in the government as a Minister on three occasions between 1915 and 1927. All
this allowed him to put across the LNU’s message, even if it was not always welcomed.
Conservative ministers might have had been suspicious of the LNU, but they were always
represented on its governing board. In fact, many of the views of moderates in the LNU
were accepted in government, in large part because they corresponded to most ministers’
own  pacificist  beliefs.  The  moral  and  religion-based  pacifism of  others,  such  as  the
Quakers,  was  accepted  as  an  honestly-held  and  honourable  point  of  view,  although
thought to be misguided and far removed from the ‘realities’ of international diplomacy.
When, however, the peace movements appeared to be in danger of veering too far to the
left  the  government  and the  Foreign Office  became alarmed.  Sheppard and the  PPU
leaders were not from the same milieu as Cecil,  although Sheppard did have several
personal  contacts  in  high places.  In  general,  PPU leaders  were  never  likely  to  meet
government ministers over dinner or at their clubs. Neither Sheppard's personal contacts
nor other PPU connections inside the Labour Party and in literary circles gave any access
to the corridors of power similar to that enjoyed by the LNU. For the most part, the PPU’s
ideas were treated with absolute contempt by the government and its permanent officials
even if  the some of the leaders were recognized as respectable men. While Sheppard
talked of a fundamental rejection of all war linked to a policy of non-resistance, Baldwin,
Chamberlain and others  inside Whitehall,  in  their  daily  dealings  with the worsening
international crisis, could not grasp, let alone accept, such a profound change of attitude
as that called for by Sheppard. Their mutual incomprehension was almost total.
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Pacifism, Pacificism, Isolationism, Appeasement and 
Defencism
The dividing lines between the various peace movements, whether they were inspired by
pacifist or by pacificist thinking and whether they drew principally on Christian, socialist
or other moral inspirations,  could never be clear-cut.  Supporters of  such groups and
movements often belonged to more than one at a time or shifted their allegiances in
reaction  to  events  at  home and,  more  importantly,  abroad.  Support  for  the  various
dimensions of the peace movement could also overlap with support for isolationism from
Europe, the appeasement of the dictators and, for some, a policy of rearmament, in so far
as it  was designed to reinforce a policy of collective security based on the League of
Nations  and/or  defence of  democracies  threatened by fascism.  At  the  other  political
extreme,  some  supporters  of  the  peace  movement  were  prepared  to  envisage  a
substantial revision of the Versailles Treaty in order to assuage German demands. Some
went so far as to become sympathetic with, even apologists for, Nazi German claims that
they had been victims of an unjust peace. Given this diversity of opinion within the broad
spectrum of groups that made up the peace movement it is difficult to arrive at any clear
conclusions as to their actual impact on government decisions.
The inconsistencies in the peace movement’s approaches to international affairs became
all the more evident when it was confronted with an actual international crisis of real
danger and with open warfare. In 1935, Italy, after months of clearly visible preparation,
invaded Ethiopia, one of the few remaining independent African states and a signed up
member of the League of Nations. Such a blatant act of international aggression, in clear
violation of League principles and of international law, presented clear choices to the
British government and to supporters of the peace movement. Few of them, with the
exception of some of the most devout pacifists, were able to adopt a coherent line. Instead
it was the sense of confusion, and deep disappointment that war had not been avoided in
the first place, that prevailed. Sheppard admitted in July 1935, even before the outbreak
of hostilities, that “Abyssinia and Italy simply beats me. I don’t know what we pacifists ought to
be at.”31
The interactions between pacifists and the various peace movements on the one hand and
supporters of isolationism, appeasement or of a “realist” approach were often complex
and changeable. This became increasingly the case over the course of the 1930s as Britain
was confronted by the growing threat of war. Attitudes and beliefs that had previously
been theoretical  were now being challenged by the harsh reality of  violence in Asia
(Manchuria), Africa (Ethiopia) and Europe (Spain, Austria, Czechoslovakia). By 1939 the
threat was no longer only to other countries but to Britain itself. This new situation led
many previous supporters of pacifism to rethink their positions. At the same time, there
was a hardening of the official policy adopted by the government which distanced itself
more  and  more  from  the  idealistic  views  of  the  peace  movements.  The  changing
international environment also led to a realignment of the peace movements and changes
in the ways in which they related to government and government policy. 
Many pacifists shared the appeasers’ dislike of the League of Nations and the policy of
collective security which, they felt, risked dragging Britain into wars that they had no
concern with. This was backed up by their shared disapproval of the pro-French and anti-
German stance of the Foreign Office which many regarded as a throwback to the pre-1914
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system of armed alliances that had been one of the causes of Britain’s entry into the First
World War. Military sanctions in the name of the League of Nation’s collective security
meant  in  effect  going  to  war  in  the  defence  of  any  country  that  was  a  victim  of
aggression. This could never be an acceptable line for pacifists. For the appeasers and the
isolationists, it was unnecessary. However, for many supporters of the League of Nations
in the LNU,  and for  a  growing number on the left,  the seriousness  of  the threat  to
international  peace  posed  by  the  militaristic  regime in  Japan,  Fascist  Italy  and Nazi
Germany meant that such idealistic pacifism was unthinkable. Instead they called for a
reinforcement of the country’s military strength and, if needs be, for the country to be
prepared to go to war to defend those countries that were being threatened and, from a
purely national perspective, to defend Britain itself. Support for rearmament and taking
on a commitment to intervene militarily on the continent in the event of international
aggression could, therefore, be supported by some in the peace movement, on condition
that this was done in the name of the League of Nations. For pacifists this was just the
pre-war alliance system by another name. For socialist pacifists in particular the start of
Franco’s  attempt  to  overthrow  the  Republican  government  in  Spain  was  a  decisive
turning-point and led many of them to conclude that the need to defend democracy and
socialism overrode their belief in pacifism. The Spanish Civil War was a cause that many
socialists and pacifists, including Brockway, thought worth fighting for. Those pacifists
who stood out against this line now found themselves alongside right-wing isolationists
and  pro-German  sympathizers,  something  which  many  felt  ill  at  ease  with.  Others
suffered a form of schizophrenia, backing armed resistance against fascism in Spain but
holding onto the basic principles of pacifism at home. 
 
Pacifism, Peace Movements and their Impact on
Policy-Making
Many later accounts attempted to place at least part of the responsibility for Britain’s
unpreparedness to meet the challenge from the totalitarian states at the feet of the peace
movements who, it is alleged, held back the governments of the 1930s from the measures
that they knew were required but which they refrained from introducing for fear of
provoking  a  popular  backlash.  According  to  this  scenario,  the  peace  movements’
propaganda instilled in the country an opposition to any strong line in either foreign or
defence policies. In its place they encouraged a woolly thinking that was far removed
from the realities of international affairs.  Such arguments overestimate the influence
that these groups exercised. In the case of the Peace Ballot, it is fair to argue that this may
have influenced the government’s rhetoric and its electoral strategy but not the direction
of British policy. The Peace ballot was a massive declaration of public support for the
League and for the principle of collective security and it strengthened those who wanted
to  adopt  a  harder  line  towards  Italian  aggression.  It  did  not,  however,  reverse
government  policy  or  impose  a  fundamentally  different  approach  from  that  which
ministers had already agreed on. Nor did it prevent the government from attempting to
reach  a  dubious,  and  secretive,  deal  with  the  French  and  the  Italians,  at  Ethiopia’s
expense, a deal which flouted the most basic League principles. When this was revealed,
the  public  outcry  against  the  government’s  double-standards  did  force  the  Foreign
Secretary’s resignation but it did nothing to bring about a change of direction in policy. 
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Nevertheless, the peace movement as a whole could sometimes act as a constraint on the
government’s ability to direct policy along the lines, and at the speed, it wanted. During
the vain international negotiations to reach an agreement on disarmament in 1932-34,
the pressure on the government from the peace movement had been considerable. Two
years later, it was rearmament that was on the political agenda. This remained a sensitive
issue and one that aroused strong opposition across the peace movement, parts of which
were still  wedded to the fundamental  belief  that  arms races led inevitably to armed
conflict, just as they had in 1914. Stanley Baldwin later argued that he had been held back
from launching the rearmament programme the country needed earlier because of the
peace movement’s opposition and the impact this would have had on his government’s
electoral  fortunes.  Similarly  the  “continental  commitment”  to  stand  by  France  and
Belgium militarily in the event of  a  German attack was constantly watered down by
Ministers in part due to the strength of opposition in the peace movement to France’s
perceived  militarism.  Later  on  the  peace  movement’s  support  for  a  policy  of
reconciliation and economic appeasement, and for an agreement between the so-called
“haves” and “have-nots”, also fed into Chamberlain’s policy of political appeasement. Yet,
in all these examples, the government was committed to these policies regardless of the
arguments and pressures expressed by the peace movement.
The British peace movements of the interwar years were certainly vigorous. They were,
however, rarely able to come together to act as a coherent force. Each movement was also
divided within its own ranks by personal quarrels, political differences and sometimes by
accusations of improper conduct. By the end of the decade the peace movement lacked
any sense of unity. Gilbert Murray admitted in 1937 that the LNU was “no longer a Peace
Party opposing a Jingo Party. We are a ‘League of Collective Security’ party opposing pacifists,
isolationists, pro-Germans. We are actually for a ‘spirited foreign policy!’”32 All this drove a deep
wedge between the pacifists and the internationalists with the PPU on one side and the
LNU leadership, although not all its members, on the other. Cecil complained in May 1935
“that some pacifists seem to hate collective security even more than they hate rearmament.” “The
only alternative to the old policy of armaments and alliances”, he argued, “is that of a league for
the mutual defence of all.”33 In saying this, Cecil was highlighting the fundamental fracture
than ran through the peace movement. The two sides became ever more divided on this
issue in the four remaining years before the outbreak of war.
If we accept Ceadel’s argument that, by the end of the 1930s, pacifism was “not so much a
policy for war prevention as an act of faith”34 or A.J.P. Taylor’s view that “pacifism” and “the
doctrine of non-resistance” were “the negation of policy, not an alternative”35, then it should
be accepted that its ambition had never been to act directly as a leverage on policy-
makers. The PPU saw itself, in the words of Aldous Huxley, as “a fellowship of men and
women... enthusiastic missionaries in the cause” who regarded their pacifism “in terms of a
Faith.”36 For Sheppard the pacifists’ “duty is to prevent war” and that “If war comes we shall
have failed.”37 Unable to come up with an effective or convincing pacifist policy to avoid
war and to dampen either international tensions or jingoistic sentiments at home, of
which there were in fact very few in the 1930s,  the only hope for the pacifist  peace
movement, and in particular the PPU, was to achieve such a mass membership that the
government would be forced to take them into consideration. In July 1935 Sheppard told
a meeting at the Albert Hall: “Send me a million men like you and then any government must
look out.”38 He did succeed in attracting a mass following with his unequivocal pacifist
message but this alone was not enough and even with over 100,000 signatories the PPU
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fell  far short of its ambitions. Without this it  had little chance of bringing about the
fundamental  change in the government’s  international  outlook that it  was aiming to
achieve. The claim in 1935 that Sheppard was “one of the most influential men in England, one
who was bound to be considered by leaders of all parties”39 or that made by Canon Charles
Raven  the  following  year  that  Christian  pacifism was  now “in  the  sphere  of  practical
politics… The practical politicians were in fact taking pacifism seriously”40 overstate their real
influence. The PPU had deliberately chosen not to enter the political arena directly by
contesting elections or by expressing support for any particular party. Most of its support
came from the left although Sheppard himself had voted for the National Government in
1931 and was socially conservative on all domestic policy questions. Any attempt to unite
the PPU on a broad range of issues would have been impossible. But it did not want to
exist in some sort of spiritual isolation, removed from the real world. Sheppard and other
pacifist leaders claimed that they were operating very much in the realm of practical
politics and were not confined to ivory towers, Churches or Meeting Houses. In reality,
the PPU remained a marginal propaganda group whose ideas had little or no impact on
government decisions,  voicing a  desperate but  vain plea for  reason and peace in an
increasingly unreasonable and violent international environment. 
The PPU, like the British peace movement in its entirety, was handicapped by not having
the time that it would have needed to move opinion away from the more “realistic” way
of viewing international relations and to convince the people of Britain, and elsewhere, of
the merits of adopting a more peaceful outlook. Its belief in the force of pacifism was
overestimated. If enough men were to simply refuse to fight, they believed, governments
would have no other choice than to sue for peace. Individual choices in this sense would
come together in a collective movement that  would have an irremediable impact on
government and bring about peace. The confidence of pacifists, as, for example Donald
Soper’s argument that “pacifism contains a spiritual force strong enough to repel any invader”41
or Aldous Huxley’s that “pacifism is to war what clean water and clean milk are to typhoid; it
makes the outbreak of war impossible”42, seems naïve, especially in the face of the brutality
and determination of the potential invaders the country was facing. Nor did it have any
means of exercising any real influence over those people who were in positions of power
and who could decide on questions of war and peace, neither those in Britain nor, more
significantly, internationally who were perfectly immune from any pressure that British
or international opinion could deploy. 
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ABSTRACTS
1918 was regarded by many observers at the time as marking the end of an era and the death of
the old international order. Hopes for a peaceful future and a deep-rooted abhorrence of war as a
means of settling international disputes were characteristic of large parts of British opinion in
the interwar years. Pacifism, in its most general sense, was widely shared across British society.
British decision makers shared this broadly felt revulsion against war. This was backed up by the
purely  rational  calculation  that  Britain  had  nothing  to  gain  from  war  and  that  its  national
interests would be best served by preserving international peace.
These sentiments were channelled via a number of different peace movements which drew on
various forms of socialist, humanist and Christian thought. While they all shared a common and
broadly peaceful outlook there remained strikingly divergent approaches between what some
historians such as A.J.P. Taylor and Martin Ceadel have termed the pacificists as opposed to the
pacifists.  While  the former put  forward a  broadly  peaceful  policy  the latter  group remained
opposed to all war on principle, to the point of adopting a policy of non-resistance. Over the
course  of  the  interwar  years,  with  the  heightened  threat  to  international  peace  from  the
revisionist  powers  in  Europe  and  the  Far  East,  the  tensions  between  the  various  peace
movements became ever greater. 
At  times,  as  for  example  during  the  Italo-Ethiopian  war,  the  peace  movement  was  able  to
mobilise a mass following that was able to exercise a significant pressure on decision makers.
However, the anti-war sentiments expressed by movements such as the League of Nations Union
and the Peace Pledge were in fact widely shared from within official circles. The more clear-cut
pacifists however, who refused to support a policy of either rearmament or of collective security
in the name of the League of Nations, had little input into policy making and their ideas and
leaders were, for the most part, dismissed out of hand. By the time that war came in 1939, both
sides of the peace movement had lost much, if not all, of their earlier enthusiasm and support in
the country.
Les sentiments pacifistes, dans le sens plus général du terme, furent largement partagés dans la
société britannique de l’entre-deux-guerres, même par une partie des décideurs pour qui l’idée
d’entrer  dans une nouvelle  guerre  mondiale  était  vue avec horreur.  Cette  approche était  en
accord avec les calculs les plus élémentaires selon lesquels la Grande-Bretagne n’avait  rien à
gagner et tout à perdre si une telle guerre arrivait. 
Ces  sentiments  se  sont  exprimés  à  travers  différents  mouvements  pacifistes  fondés  sur  les
idéologies socialiste,  humaniste ou chrétienne. Bien que tous partageaient la même vision du
monde  et  une  opposition  à  la  guerre,  les  différents  mouvements  furent  fondamentalement
divisés  dans  leurs  approches.  D’un  côté  les  pacifistes  les  plus  radicaux  restèrent  opposés  à
l’utilisation de la force militaire, même en cas de menace directe, alors que les plus modérés
acceptèrent qu’en cas extrême le recours à la guerre pouvait être justifié. La montée des tensions
internationales dans les années 1930 accentua ces divisions et les oppositions.
A certains moments, comme par exemple lors de la guerre italo-éthiopienne, les mouvements
pacifistes  ont  su  mobilisé  un  grand  nombre  de  personnes  ce  qui  les  a  permis  d’avoir  une
influence  directe  sur  la  politique  menée  par  le  gouvernement  et  la  diplomatie  britannique.
Cependant l’opposition à la guerre qu’exprima les plus grands mouvements pacifistes comme la
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League of Nations Union ou la Peace Pledge Union fut partagée par la plupart des décideurs. Par
contre, l’opposition à la guerre en tout circonstance défendu par les plus radicaux des pacifistes,
tout  comme leur  rejet  d’une  politique  de  réarmement  ou  de  sécurité  collective  à  travers  la
Société des nations, fut rejetée sans hésitation par les décideurs. Au moment où la guerre s’est
déclenchée à nouveau en 1939, le mouvement pacifiste, toute tendance confondue, avait perdu
son dynamisme et la plupart de ses soutiens dans le pays. 
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